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Authority with the Force of Law: Statutory
Interpretation as Policymaking in
Gonzales v. Oregon
1

Gonzales v. Oregon
I. INTRODUCTION

The Oregon Death with Dignity Act 2 was enacted in 1994 by the State
of Oregon to allow physicians to aid terminally ill patients who wished to end
their lives in a controlled manner. 3 In 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft
issued an Interpretive Rule stating that prescribing a controlled substance for
the purpose of physician-assisted suicide would not qualify as a requisite
"legitimate medical purpose" under the federal Controlled Substances Act,
and that any physician who prescribed a controlled substance for the purpose
of ending a patient's life faced deregistration.4 In Gonzales v. Oregon, the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Attorney General's Interpretive Rule was invalid because it was outside of the scope of his authority
delegated by Congress.
Because the issue of physician-assisted suicide is one that generates so
much controversy, this case has received a large amount of publicity and
comment from many spheres of public life. However, neither the Court nor
the dissent spent much time discussing the issue of physician-assisted suicide,
and instead, both of the opinions based their arguments in the framework of
administrative law. Within this structure, two competing jurisprudential philosophies collide; as a result, Gonzales v. Oregon offers insight into how such
disputes will be debated and resolved in the foreseeable future. 5 This note
examines the Court's decision, the accompanying jurisprudential doctrines,
and the potential ramifications of both this ruling and Justice Scalia's dissent
in light of an ongoing debate regarding physician-assisted suicide and the
scope of agency rulemaking authority.

1. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
2. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897.
3. See id. § 127.885 (2003).
4. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607,
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
5. A full discussion of the two philosophies, for the purposes of this Note described as "textualism" and "intentionalism," is outside the scope of this analysis. For
a more thorough analysis of this topic, see Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA.
L. REv. 347 (2005)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING

In 1994, the State of Oregon legalized assisted suicide when voters,
through a ballot measure, approved the Oregon Death With Dignity Act
(ODWDA). 6 ODWDA exempts from civil or criminal liability physicians
who dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of drugs to terminally ill patients in
accordance with specific safeguards. 7 The drugs used by physicians under
ODWDA, while not specified in the Act itself, 8 are regulated under the Controlled Substances Act (cSA), 9 which restricts the availability of certain
drugs for medically accepted uses only.1
In July 1997, Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry Hyde, concerned by the passage of ODWDA, wrote a letter to Thomas Constantine,
then Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), suggesting that the DEA issue an interpretation of the CSA that would permit revocation of registration for any practitioner who issues a prescription pursuant to
ODWDA. 11 In response, Constantine issued a letter stating the position that,
if conducted in the method prescribed by ODWDA, physician-assisted suicide violated the CSA. In response, the Oregon Medical Association advised
physicians
12 against writing prescriptions under ODWDA until the issue was
settled. However, before any further action on the subject was taken, in June
of 1998 the Justice Department determined that the DEA did not have the
authority 13to take such a position under the terms of the CSA and reversed its
position.
Three years later, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an Interpretive
Rule stating that assisting suicide was not a "legitimate medical purpose" and
that any physician who prescribed federally controlled substances for that
purpose would be subject to the suspension or revocation of his or her regis6. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897.

7. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 911 (2006).
8. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897. The drugs used to carry out the provisions of the ODWDA are prescribed in smaller doses for pain alleviation. Gonzales,
126 S. Ct. at 911.
9. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
10. See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 911-12. The drugs used in order carry out physician-assisted suicide under ODWDA are all classified under schedule II of the CSA.
See infra note 23 and accompanying text for more information about scheduling.
11. Raphael Cohen-Almagor & Monica G. Hartman, The Oregon Death With
DignityAct: Review and Proposalsfor Improvement, 27 J. LEGIS. 269, 275-76 (2001).
12. Id.

13. Id. at 276. In a letter to Senator Hatch, Attorney General Janet Reno "concluded that the DEA could not take the proposed action because the CSA did not
authorize it to displace the states as the primary regulators of the medical profession,
or to override a state's determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical practice." Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 913. This determination led to a Congressional attempt
to expressly dictate the same proposition in the text of the CSA by passing the Pain
Relief Promotion Act. See infra note 46.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/15
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tration under the CSA "regardless of whether state law authorizes or permits
such conduct."' 4 Because all prescriptions filled under ODWDA are classified under Schedule II of the
CSA, this rule effectively preempted such pre15
scription as a federal crime.
In response to the Attorney General's Interpretive Rule, the State of
Oregon, joined by a number of interested Oregon residents, filed suit in federal court to block the Rule. 16 On April 17, 2002, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Oregon entered a permanent injunction against enforcement of
the Rule, holding it exceeded the authority delegated to the Attorney General
by the CSA. 17 A divided Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, reasoning that because the Rule "interferes with Oregon's authority to regulate
medical care within its borders," it "alter[s] the 'usual constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal Government' without the requisite "unmistakably clear" authorization of Congress. 18 The Supreme Court granted
the Government's petition for certiorari in February, 2005.19
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. The Court held that the government's interpretation - that prescriptions for assisted suicide constituted "drug abuse" under the CSA - was
"discordant with the phrase's consistent use throughout the statute, not to

14. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607,
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001). The relevant part of the rule in its original context:
For the reasons set forth in the OLC Opinion, I hereby determine that assisting suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose" within the meaning of
21 CFR § 1306.04 (2001), and that prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances to assist suicide violates the CSA.
Such conduct by a physician registered to dispense controlled substances
may "render his registration * * * inconsistent with the public interest"
and therefore subject to possible suspension or revocation under 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4). This conclusion applies regardless of whether state law authorizes or permits such conduct by practitioners or others and regardless of
the condition of the person whose suicide is assisted. I hereby direct the
DEA, effective upon publication of this memorandum in the Federal Register, to enforce and apply this determination, notwithstanding anything to
the contrary in the June 5, 1998, Attorney General's letter.
Id.
15. See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 914. For more information about Scheduling
under the CSA, see infra note 23.
16. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 914.
17. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1092-93 (D. Or. 2002), affd, 368
F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), affd sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
The court found that neither the plain language nor the legislative history of the CSA
supported the Attorney General's putative authority to issue such a regulation. Id. at
1088-91.
18. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2004) (alteration in
original) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991)).
19. Gonzales v. Oregon, 543 U.S. 1145 (2005).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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mention its ordinary meaning. ' 2° Additionally, the Court held that "the CSA's
prescription requirement does not authorize the Attorney General to bar dispensing controlled substances for assisted
suicide in the face of a state medi21
cal regime permitting such conduct."

Ed. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The FederalControlled SubstancesAct
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) was enacted in 1970 to create a
comprehensive uniform national scheme for regulating the manufacture, distribution, and dispensation of a variety of chemicals and substances. 22 The
CSA creates five schedules of controlled substances for the purpose of allowing each to be regulated at a different level. 23
Initially, Congress prescribed a number of specific substances to be included within the scheduling system, 24 and delegated to the Attorney General
the power, via rulemaking authority, to add substances to a schedule, transfer
25
substances between schedules, and remove substances from a schedule.
Such a rule must be made on the record, after a hearing pursuant to the procedures set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 553. 26 However, before initiating the rulemaking
procedure, the Attorney General must gather data on the substance and request from the Secretary of Health and Human Services a scientific and
medical evaluation in addition to the Secretary's recommendation as to the

20. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 925.
21. Id.
22. Scott Gast, Who Defines "Legitimate Medical Practice?" Lessons Learned
from the Controlled Substances Act, Physician-Assisted Suicide, & Oregon v.
Ashcroft, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 261, 265 (2002). The CSA was designed to simultaneously protect access to those substances that "have a useful and legitimate
medical purpose" while preventing their "improper use." 21 U.S.C. § 801(l)-(2)
(2000).
23. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812. Drugs are included in a given schedule based on
their perceived potential for abuse, their currently accepted medical use, and their
potential to lead to dependence. See id. § 812(b). Schedule I drugs are those with "no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States" that have "a high
potential for abuse," and includes such substances as heroin and peyote. Id. §
812(b)(1), (c). All other schedules have some medically accepted use and are classified in decreasing levels of potential for abuse and dependence. See id. § 812(b)(2)(5). For example, substances in schedule H are authorized for medical use "with severe restrictions." Id. § 812(b)(2)(B).
24. See id. § 812(c).
25. Id. § 811(a).
26. See id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/15

4

20063

Ludwig: Ludwig: Authority with the Force of Law
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

1145

proposed rule." The recommendations of the Secretary as to the control or
removal of a substance are binding on the Attorney General.2 8
Except as authorized by the CSA, it is unlawful to "knowingly or inten29
tionally. . . manufacture, distribute, or dispense.., a controlled substance."
Part C of Subchapter I deals generally with the registration of persons authorized to manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances. 30 The Attorney General "shall register practitioners ... to dispense . .. substances" in
schedules II through V "if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . .controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices." 3 The
Attorney General may deny such an application "if he determines that the
32
issuance of such registration would be inconsistent with the public interest.,
Registrants are authorized to distribute controlled substances "to the extent

27. Id. § 811(b). Both the Attorney General and the Secretary must consider a
number of factors regarding any decision to control or remove a substance from the
schedules, including
(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse. (2) Scientific evidence of its
pharmacological effect, if known. (3) The state of current scientific
knowledge regarding the drug or other substance. (4) Its history and current pattern of abuse. (5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse.
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health. (7) Its psychic or
physiological dependence liability. (8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under this subchapter.
Id. § 811(b)-(c).
28. Id. § 811(b).
29. Id. § 841(a)(1).
30. See id. §§ 821-30. Section 822 in particular regulates "[p]ersons required to
register," and requires those persons who dispense controlled substances to obtain
registration "in accordance with the rules and regulations" established by the Attorney
General. Id. § 822(a)(2).
31. Id. § 823(f). A practitioner is defined by the CSA as "a physician, dentist,
veterinarian, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed,
registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he
practices or does research, to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to,
administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis, a controlled substance in the
course of professional practice or research." Id. § 802(21).
32. Id. § 823(0. In determining whether such registration is inconsistent with the
public interest, the Attorney General "shall" consider as factors
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or professional disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting research with
respect to controlled substances.
(3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State laws relating
to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws relating to
controlled substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and safety.
ld. § 823(f)(l)-(5).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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authorized by their registration and in conformity" with the rest of Subchapter
C of the Act.33 Even after registration is granted, it may be revoked by the
Attorney General. Prior to 1984, the Attorney General could only deregister a
physician who provided false information on the application, who was convicted of a felony relating to controlled substances, or who had his state license or registration revoked.34 Pursuant to the 1984 amendment? 5 registration may be suspended or revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding
that the registrant "has committed such acts as would render his registration.
. inconsistent with the public
interest" as determined under the requirements
36
of Section 823 of the Act.
The Attorney General is also granted the power to create rules and regulations relating to the registration and control of controlled substances, 3 as
well as any rules, regulations, or procedures deemed "necessary and appropriate for the efficient execution of his functions" under the Act. as In 1971,
the Drug Enforcement Agency issued a regulation requiring prescriptions for
controlled substances to "be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional prac-

33. Id. § 822(b).
34. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, § 304(a), 84 Stat. 1236, 1255 (1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §
824(a) (2000)).
A registration pursuant to section 303 to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance may be suspended or revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding that the registrant - (1) has materially falsified
any application filed pursuant to or required by this title or title I1; (2) has
been convicted of a felony under this title or title III or any other law of
the United States, or of any State, relating to any substance defined in this
title as a controlled substance; or (3) has had his State license or registration suspended, revoked, or denied by competent State authority and is no
longer authorized by State law to engage in the manufacturing, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances.
Id.
35. See Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 512, 98 Stat 1837, 2073 (1984) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)
(2000)).
36. Id. § 512(2). This is not the only possible reason for suspension; the others
are detailed in § 824(a)(1)-(3), (5). For the factors in Section 823 applicable to the
registration of practitioners, see supra note 32.
37. Id. § 821 (amended 2004). "Control" is defined as "to add a drug or other
substance, or immediate precursor, to a schedule under part B of this subchapter,
whether by transfer from another schedule or otherwise." Id. § 802(5). Such "control"
would necessitate the procedures outlined in section 811. See supra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text. All definitions in section 802 are to "as used in this subchapter,"
referring to Subchapter I of the CSA, codified as 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-903.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 871(b). This section includes the words "this subchapter," relating to Subchapter 1 of the Act: "Control and Enforcement."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/15
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tice. ' ,3 9 As a result, registration under the CSA may be revoked or suspended
if a practitioner prescribes a controlled substance for something other than a
"legitimate medical purpose."
B. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act
In November 1994, Oregon voters approved by ballot initiative the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA) by a small margin. 41 From its inception, ODWDA, which permitted physician-assisted suicide, was surrounded in controversy. Over the next few years, ODWDA survived a court
challenge 42 and an attempt by opponents to repeal it by the same ballot initiative method that was used to enact its passage. 43 By the time Oregon voters
rejected its repeal, the Supreme Court had already handed down its decision
in Washington v. Glucksberg,44 effectively allowinA the states to decide
whether or not to legalize physician accepted suicide. Though the issue was
debated at the federal level after Glucksberg,46 prior to the instant decision,
ODWDA remained the law of Oregon.
39. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2005). See also Regulations Implementing the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 36 Fed. Reg. 7,799 (Apr.
24, 1971); Gast, supra note 22, at 268 n.31 (detailing further the authority under
which this regulation was promulgated).
40. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (2003).
41. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 11, at 271-72. Fifty-one percent voted in favor
of the Act, while forty-nine percent were opposed. Id. at 272.
42. The ODWDA was initially struck down on the grounds that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995). However, this case was subsequently vacated for procedural reasons, specifically that the
Federal courts did not have jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs' claims on the basis that
the plaintiffs lacked standing. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1387-92 (9th Cir.
1997).
43. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 11, at 274-75. The rejection of this ballot measure was by a 60%-40% margin, an increase in support that Cohen-Almagor and Hartman attribute to "anger over the fact that [voters] were forced to vote on the issue for
the second time." Id. at 275.
44. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
45. While the court in Glucksburg did not expressly delegate to states the right to
legalize physician-assisted suicide, it did leave the issue deliberately open. See id. at
735 ("Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound
debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
holding permits this debate to continue .... "); see also id. at 788 (Souter, J., concurring) ("Legislatures, on the other hand, have superior opportunities to obtain the facts
necessary for a judgment about [physician-assisted suicide] .... There is, indeed,
good reason to suppose that ... just such experimentation will be attempted in some
of the States." (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (Supp. 1996)) (acknowledging
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act)).
46. Congress passed laws in 1997 that bar the use of federal funds in physicianassisted suicide. See Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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ODWDA authorizes a capable adult 47 who is an Oregon resident 48 that
has been determined by an attending physician and a consulting physician to
be suffering from a terminal disease to make an informed decision 49 to request medication for the purpose of ending his or her life. 50 A number of
safeguards exist within the Act to ensure that no abuse of physician-assisted
suicide occurs. A series of statutory requirements are prescribed for the attending physician, 51 whose diagnosis must be confirmed in writing by the
consulting physician after a second examination of the patient. 52 There is a
fifteen day waiting period between the patient's initial request and the date
the prescription is issued, and a 48 hour waiting period between the written
request and the issuance of the prescription. 53 At all times, the patient has an
unequivocal right to rescind the request, 54 and anyone who, intending to
cause the death of the patient, alters or forges a request for medication, con-

105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 18, 22, 25,
29, 38, and 42 U.S.C.). In 1999, the Pain Relief Promotion Act, which would have
amended the Controlled Substances Act to proscribe the use of controlled substances
for assisting suicide, was proposed both in the House and Senate. See Pain Relief
Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999). The Pain Relief Promotion
Act died in part because Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon threatened a filibuster, and
the bill never reached a floor vote in the Senate. Lindsay R. Kandra, Comment, Questioning the Foundationof Attorney GeneralAshcroft's Attempt to Invalidate Oregon's
Death With Dignity Act, 81 OR. L. REv. 505, 515 (2002).
47. An "adult" is "an individual 18 years of age or older." OR. REV. STAT. §

127.800(1) (2005).
48. See id. § 127.860.
49. An "informed decision" is a decision "by a qualified patient.., that is based
on an appreciation of the relevant facts and after being fully informed by the attending
physician of' a variety of factors. Id. § 127.800(7). The attending physician is responsible for verifying that the patient is making an informed decision immediately prior
to writing a prescription for medicine under the Act. Id. § 127.830.
50. Id. § 127.805(1). Such a request must be made orally and in writing, and the
patient must reiterate the oral request no less than fifteen days after it was initially
made. Id. § 127.840. The written request must be witnessed by at least two individuals, one of whom is not a relative, or entitled to any portion of the individual's estate,
or an owner, operator of a health care facility where the patient is receiving medical
treatment, who can attest to its voluntary nature under the terms of the statute. Id. §
127.810.
51. Id. § 127.815. These requirements are extensive, and require, among other
things, that the patient be informed of his or her diagnosis, the consequences of taking
the prescription requested, and feasible alternatives to suicide. Id.
52. Id. § 127.820. Additionally, if in the opinion of either physician the patient
may be suffering from a disorder or depression impairing the patient's judgment, the
physician is required to refer the patient for counseling. Id. § 127.825.
53. Id. § 127.850.
54. Id. § 127.845.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/15
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ceals or destroys a rescission of a request, or exerts
undue influence on a pa55
tient to request medication is guilty of a felony.
ODWDA protects those in good faith compliance with its provisions
from a number of penalties, including being subject to civil or criminal liability or professional disciplinary action, 56 any penalty by a professional organization or health care provider, 57 and allegations of neglect. 58 Health care providers are not under any duty to participate in ODWDA and59may prevent its
provisions from being carried out on premises that they own.
C. The Administrative ProcedureAct and JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretations
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA)6° is the law under which federal agencies create rules and regulations and adjudicate disputes to carry out
their various mandates. Before promulgating a rule, agencies are required by
the APA to provide notice of the proposed rule 61 and to hear and consider
comments on the proposal. 62 This notice and comment procedure does not
apply to "interpretive rules."63 Interpretive rules are not formally defined in
the text of the APA, but can be generally thought of as rules "issued by an
agency to advise the public64of the agency's construction of the statutes and
rules which it administers."
When agencies make rules or issue adjudications, there are often competing interests and authorities at work. As a result, courts have often had to
decide whether a given agency-issued rule or adjudication is correctly enforceable. One of the earliest cases to establish a doctrine as to the enforceability of agency rules purporting to interpret statutes was Skidmore v. Swift
& Co.65 In Skidmore, the Supreme Court observed that the APA does not
address the amount of deference courts should give administrative conclusions, and held that such conclusions are "entitled to respect" because they
55. Id. § 127.890(1)-(2).
56. Id. § 127.885(1).
57. Id. § 127.885(2).
58. Id. § 127.885(3).
59. Id. § 127.885(4)-(5). Subsection (5) requires that the prohibiting provider
notify other providers on its premises and prescribes a number of permitted sanctions
if such a prohibition is flouted. Id.
60. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-599 (2000).
61. This notice "shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice
thereof in accordance with law." Id. § 553(b).
62. Id. § 553(c).
63. Id. § 553(b)(3)(A).
64. See Elizabeth Williams, What Constitutes "Intepretative Rule" [sic] of
Agency so as to Exempt Such Action from Notice Requirements of Administrative
ProcedureAct, 126 A.L.R. FED. 347 § 2[a] (1995).
65. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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embody the purported experience and expertise of a given agency. 66 However, the weight given
to an administrative conclusion was limited to its
"power to persuade." 67 Skidmore enumerated some considerations that illuminated the sco e of this power and essentially amounted to a multi-factored
balancing test.
Skidmore essentially remained the law for forty years until a revolution69
occurred in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that if Congress has clearly or directly
spoken to an issue in the text of the statute, courts are bound to defer to the
language therein. 70 If, however, a statute is silent or ambiguous on a given
issue, courts are to determine whether an a ency's interpretation is "based on
a permissible construction of the statute." 7 A specific agency's construction
is permissible72if Congress has explicitly or implicitly left a "gap" for the
agency to fill.

In Chevron, the Supreme Court established a two-prong test that was alluringly simple when compared to Skidmore's multi-factored inquiry; the
only question under the first prong was whether Congress had clearly spoken
to an issue, and only if this question was answered in the negative did the
court even address whether the agency's construction were permissible. 73 If
the latter event, Chevron dictates that if there is an "express delegation of
authority to the agency" to interpret the statute via regulation, the regulation
is afforded "controlling weight" unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 74 Similarly, if there is implicit delegation to an
agency by Congress, a court is still required to uphold a "reasonable interpre66. Id. at 139-40 (discussing that "[tihere is no statutory provision as to what, if
any, deference courts should pay to the Administrator's conclusions" but that such
conclusions "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance").
67. Id. at 140.
68. "The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. The other "factors which give [agency
interpretations] power to persuade" were not discussed in Skidmore, and subsequent
courts added their own considerations over the following years. See Jamie A. Yavelberg, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: JudicialDeference to Agency Interpretations

after EEOC v. Aramco, 42 DuKE L. J. 166, 180-81 (1992) (alteration in original).
69. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
70. Id. at 842-43. The judiciary is the final authority on this issue. See id. at 843
n.9 ("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law
and must be given effect.").
71. Id. at 843.

72. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
73. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.

74. Id. at 843-44.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/15
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tation made by the ...agency.75 Agency decisions properly made after such
delegation that "'represent[] a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies' are entitled to deference "'unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned."'' 76 Only in the event that Congress had neither clearly spoken to
an issue nor explicitly or implicitly delegated authority to an agency to interpret such an ambiguity was the 77
court not required to defer, in which case it
defaulted to a Skidmore analysis.
Two cases in recent years have significantly altered the landscape with
regard to questions of agency deference. The first, Christensen v. Harris
County,78 delineated between agency interpretations that have "the force of
law" and those that do not. In Christensen,the question of deference involved
an opinion letter, and the Court held that agency interpretations contained in
"policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines" which lack
the force of law do not warrant Chevron deference in part because they contain no formal procedural requirements for their issuance.79 Barring the application of Chevron for rules that have not undergone formal procedures under
the APA, the Court held that these types of informal rules are only entitled to
Skidmore8 deference and found the agency's interpretation unpersuasive in
that case. 0
The following year, this doctrine was refined in U.S. v. Mead Corp.81 In
Mead, the Court held that agency regulations interpreting statutes will only be
afforded deference if Congress has delegated "authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law," and if the rule in question was
created in the exercise of that authority.82 Whereas Christensen held that no

informal rules or non-binding adjudications would be afforded Chevron def75. Id. at 844.
76. Id. at 845 (quoting U.S. v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
77. Though defaulting to Skidmore in the event of failing the second prong is not
explicitly discussed in the text of Chevron, courts cited Skidmore with approval in the
post-Chevron era even before Mead. See Yavelberg, supra note 68, at 188 n. 116.
78. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
79. Id. at 587 (citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995); EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991)).
80. Id. Justice Scalia foreshadowed his later dissents in Mead, see infra note 81,
and Gonzales v. Oregon, see infra Part IV.B. in the concurrence to Christensen, in
which he labeled Skidmore deference "an anachronism." Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring).
81. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
82. Id. at 226-27. The Mead standard has been criticized by Justice Scalia, who
would adhere to the pre-Mead Chevron standard, as "unduly constrained." Smith v.
City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 244-45 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Mead, 533 U.S. at 239-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (expressing the opinion that if Chevron deference is unwarranted, then no deference at all is preferable to Skidmore deference).
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erence, Mead muddied the waters by taking a step back from that proscription. In Mead, the Court specifically held that a lack of formal rulemaking
process is not in and of itself a bar to the application of Chevron.8 3 Rather, it
is the delegation of authority from Congress that is controlling, which may be
shown in "a variety of ways," including "an agency's power to engage in
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication
of a comparable congressional intent."8 4 Further, the rule must be created in
the exercise of that authority, which it is not if a statute unambiguously forbids the agency's interpretation or if
for other reasons the interpretation ex85
ceeds the bounds of the permissible.
Other judicial doctrines of agency deference have arisen since the inception of the APA. As early as 1945, the Supreme Court held that if an agency
has issued an ambiguous regulation and interprets this regulation with a subsequent rule, that administrative interpretation is "of controlling weight unless
it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. '' 6 Specifically, the
Court has been loathe to overrule agency interpretation unless a contrary
reading is compulsory because of "the regulation's plain language or by other
indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation. 87 The Court has consistently upheld this idea,88 solidifying it in the
1997 case, Auer v. Robbins.89 Auer involved the interpretation of a rule
promulgated under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, specifically a passage "exempt[ing] 'bona fide executive, administrative, or professional' employees from overtime pay requirements.' '90 In holding that the Secretary's
interpretation of his own regulation is controlling, the Court defined its attitude as a "deferential standard." 91

83. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31.
84. Id. at 226-27.
85. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 843).
86. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945).
87. Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988).
88. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 511 (1994);
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989); U.S. v. City
of Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970) (per curiam); Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965).
89. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). "Auer deference," as the court in Gonzales v. Oregon
frames it, is recognized as a subset of Chevron deference by many scholars. See Ballard v. Comm'r, 544 U.S. 40, 70 n.4 (2005) (referring to this doctrine as "Seminole
Rock deference").
90. Auer, 519 U.S. at 454-55 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2000)).
91. Id. at 461.
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Gonzales v. Oregon, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether the CSA allows the Attorney General to prohibit the prescription of
regulated drugs for the purpose of physician-assisted suicide in the face of a
state law permitting such a prescription. 92 The Court split, with Justice Kennedy writing the opinion of the court, and Justice Scalia (who was joined by
both the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas) and Justice Thomas writing dissents.
A. The Opinion of the Court
Discussing the legal background of the case, 93 the Court first turned to
the text and structure of the CSA itself, pointing out that the CSA explicitly
reserves a role for States in the regulation of controlled substances.' 4 The
Court continued, explaining the history of ODWDA and the Congressional
attempt in the late nineties to prevent its implementation through the CSA.95
Finally, the Court addressed Attorney General Ashcroft's November 9, 2001
Interpretive Rule, finding that it "would substantially disrupt the ODWDA
regime," because the prescriptions filled
under ODWDA all involve drugs
96
classified under Schedule II of the CSA.
1. Auer Deference
The first substantive issue addressed by the Court was whether the In97
terpretive Rule is entitled to "substantial deference" under Auer v. Robbins,
which requires that it interpret the Attorney General's own ambiguous regulation. 98 The Court found that Auer was distinguishable from the case at bar
because, while the underlying regulations in Auer gave specificity to a statutory scheme that the agency was charged with enforcing and reflected the
experience of the Department of Labor regarding the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the regulation that the Attorney General's Interpretive Rule purported to
clarify merely restated the language of Congress. 99 Because the language of
the regulation and the CSA are nearly equivalent, the Rule was not entitled to
the substantial deference afforded under the Auer standard.100
92. 126 S. Ct. 904, 911 (2006).
93. Much of the Court's discussion mirrors Part III of this note. See supra notes
22-91 and accompanying text.
94. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 912 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(4)).
95. Id. at 912-13; see also supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
96. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 914.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
98. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 915.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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In finding that the language between the regulation and the CSA was
similar enough to warrant equivalence, the Court focused on two phrases in
the regulation: "legitimate medical purpose" and "the course of professional
practice."'' 1 The first phrase closely resembled language found in several
different places in the statute,10 2 and the second is nearly identical to statutory
language found throughout the CSA. 10 3 The Court stated that because the
regulation does not elaborate on who decides whether a particular activity is
in "the course of professional practice" or done for a "legitimate medical
purpose," the Interpretive Rule could not be an interpretation of the regulation. 1°4 The Court further stated that, "[a]n agency does not acquire special
authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and
experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the
statutory language. ' ° The Court also found it important that the statutory
authority to issue the Interpretive Rule came from 1984 amendments to the
CSA giving the Attorney General the power to register and deregister physicians based on the public interest; these amendments postdate the regulation
purportedly
interpreted by thirteen years and do not carry a correlative in06
tent.
2. Chevron Deference
The Court next turned its attention to whether the Interpretive Rule was
entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., deference that is dependent upon the explicit or implicit delegation to the Attorney General of the authority to elaborate on an ambiguous
statute. 10 7 The Court found that the rulemaking power delegated by Congress
101. Id.
102. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B) (2000) ("currently accepted medical use"); Id.
§ 829(c) ("No controlled substance in schedule V ... may be distributed or dispensed
other than for a medical purpose."); Id. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) ("The term 'valid prescription' means a prescription which is issued for a legitimate medical purpose.").
103. See id. § 802(15) ("in the course of his professional practice"); Id. § 802(21)
("in the course of professional practice or research"); Id. § 827(c)(1)(A) ("acting in
the lawful course of their professional practice"); Id. § 828(e) ("in the course of his
professional practice or research"); Id. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) ("acting in the usual course
of the practitioner's professional practice"); Id. § 844(a) ("acting in the course of his
professional practice"); Id. § 885(a)(2) ("acting in the course of his professional practice").
104. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 915-16 ("Simply put, the existence of a parroting
regulation does not change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of the
regulation but the meaning of the statute.").
105. Id. at 916.
106. Id. ("That the current interpretation runs counter to the 'intent at the time of
the regulation's promulgation,' is an additional reason why Auer deference is unwarranted." (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994))).
107. Id.; see also supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
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to the Attorney General through the CSA did not authorize him to make a rule
illegitimating a medical standard authorized under state law.'8
In cming to this109conclusion, the Court began with the language of the
In coming
The CSA does give the Attorney General limited
delegation provision.
rulemaking powers in two provisions: first, the Attorney General may "promulgate rules and regulations and . . . charge reasonable fees relating to the

registration and control" of controlled substances, 110 and second, "[t]he Attorney General may promulgate and enforce any rules, regulations, and procedures which he may deem necessary and appropriate for the efficient execution of his functions."' These sections indicate that the Attorney General
was not delegated general authority over all provisions of the CSA, but rather
to "promulgate rules relating only to 'registration' and' 12'control,' and 'for the
efficient execution of his functions' under the statute."'
The Court first examined the Attorney General's authority to make regulations relating to the "control" of drugs, turning to the text of the CSA for the
definition of "control," which, "[a]s used in this subchapter"" 13 "means to add
a drug or other substance ... to a schedule under part B of this subchapter,
whether by transfer from another schedule or otherwise."' 14 Because the CSA
prescribes a very specific manner in which such authority must be exercised
by the Attorney General" 5 - procedures which were not observed in the
issuance of the Interpretive Rule in question - and because the Rule had
nothing to do with the scheduling of substances under the CSA, it could not
fall under the Attorney General's control authority. 116 Despite this finding,
the Court went on to examine the Rule under the assumption that "control"
means something other than its statutory definition, but found that, even un108. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 916.
109. Id. Giving some examples where the statute had given an agency "broad
power to enforce all provisions of the statute," the court found that the CSA did not
grant "this broad authority to promulgate rules" to the Attorney General. Id. (citing
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699
(2005); Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238 (2004)).
110. 21 U.S.C. § 821 (Supp. 2005). The court apparently does not contemplate
that this statute, amended in 2004, was not effective at the time the Interpretive Rule
was issued. Regardless, the version of the statute that was effective at the time of the
issuance, "[t]he Attorney General is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations
and to charge reasonable fees relating to the registration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances and to the registration and
control of regulated persons and of regulated transactions," was not substantively
different so as to affect the Court's reasoning. See id. § 821 (reflecting the statutory
language before the 2004 amendments).
111. 21 U.S.C. § 871(b) (2000).
112. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 917.

113.
114.
115.
116.

21 U.S.C. § 802 (2000); see supra note 38.
21 U.S.C. § 802(5).
See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 917.
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der such a reading, the Attorney
General did not have authority to define "le' 17
gitimate medical practice."'
Having disposed of the notion that the Interpretive Rule was promulgated pursuant to the Attorney General's authority to make rules relating to
the "control" of substances, the Court examined the registration provisions of
the CSA. 118 The Court found that on its face, the Interpretive Rule could not
be justified under these provisions because it neither comports with the fivefactor analysis required under the CSA nor claims to be an application of
Section 823(f). 119 Rather, the Interpretive Rule simply announced that assisting suicide is not in accord with any legitimate medical purpose and criminalized any such conduct notwithstanding its otherwise legal status.12 The Court
found most problematic the Interpretive Rule's failure to explain from where
the Attorney General's authority derived to decide that which constitutes a
violation of the CSA. 121 Because Congress "painstakingly described" the
procedure for deregistering a physician and scheduling a drug under the CSA,
the Court was unwilling to extend more expansive
authority through a puta122
tively implied delegation in the same statute.
The Court held that a delegation of authority to "decide '[clompliance'
with the law" did not allow the Attorney General to "decide what the law
says.' 23 This mirrors the fact that the Attorney General's responsibility to
determine generally whether a party is in compliance with federal law when

117. Id. Such a reading was possible in light of statutory references that allowed
the Attorney General to establish controls "against diversion," but the Court found
that such provisions did not give him authority to define "diversion," and that reading
"control" to give the Attorney General authority to define "legitimate medical practice" would "transform the carefully described limits on the Attorney General's authority over registration and scheduling into mere suggestions." Id.
118. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2000); see also supra notes 31-36.
119. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 918.
120. Id.
121. Id.
The explanation the Government seems to advance is that the Attorney
General's authority to decide whether a physician's actions are inconsistent with the "public interest" provides the basis for the Interpretive Rule.
By this logic, however, the Attorney General claims extraordinary authority .... to criminalize even the actions of registered physicians, whenever
they engage in conduct he deems illegitimate. This power to criminalize..
. would be unrestrained.
Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 919 (alternation in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(4) (2000))
("Were it otherwise, the Attorney General could authoritatively interpret 'State' and
'local laws,' which are also included in 21 U.S.C. § 823(f), despite the obvious constitutional problems in his doing so.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/15
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deciding whether to prosecute does not entitle such a decision to Chevron
deference. 124
To complete its analysis of whether the Interpretive Rule was entitled to
Chevron deference, the Court addressed the Attorney General's section
871(b) authority to make rules relating to the "efficient execution of his functions."' 125 The Court found that if this delegation authorized the Attorney
General to define the substantive standards of medical practice, it would not
only put section 871(b) in opposition with the CSA's otherwise-narrow delegation to the Attorney General, but it would go against the plain language of
the statute by allowing "a delegation for the 'execution' of [the Attorney
General's] functions" to create authority in the Attorney General 126
to define
other functions beyond those specifically contemplated by the CSA.
Important to this finding is the fact that the Attorney General not only
shares authority under the CSA with Secretary of Health and Human Services, but is even required to defer to the Secretary's judgment in some instances.' 27 The Secretary is primarily responsible for medical and scientific
research related to the CSA, and Congress' delegation of the authority to control substances to the Attorney General did not carry with it any mandate to
conduct medical or scientific research. 128 The Court found that the structure
and history of the CSA show that Congress lacked the intention to give the
Attorney General the authority to make "quintessentially medical judgments,"
notwithstanding the Government's conclusion to the contrary.
Similarly,
the Government's contention that the Interpretive Rule was a legal, as opposed to a medical, decision was unconvincing in part because the
30 Rule relies
on medical judgments and the views of the medical community. 1
The Court found the idea that Congress would "hide elephants in
mouseholes" by delegating such broad authority to the Attorney General
through the registration provision an untenable one that, if sustained, would
cede to the Attorney General the authority to decide whether any use
131 of a
drug under the CSA was grounds for deregistration of a physician.
Ulti124. Id. (citing Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
125. 21 U.S.C. § 871(b) (2000).
126. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 919-20 ("When Congress chooses to delegate a
power of this extent, it does so not by referring back to the administrator's functions
but by giving authority over the provisions of the statute he is to interpret." (citing
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005);
Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232 (2004))).
127. Id. at 920 ("In the scheduling context, for example, the Secretary's recommendations on scientific and medical matters bind the Attorney General. The Attorney General cannot control a substance if the Secretary disagrees." (citing 21 U.S.C. §
811 (b) (2000))).
128. Id.(quoting H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, at 33 (1970)).
129. Id. at 921.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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mately, the Court ruled that the CSA did not grant the Attorney General authority to issue the Interpretive Rule "with the force of law."'132 Accordingly,
133
the Court held that Chevron deference was improper in this case.
3. Skidmore Deference
Because the Court found that the Interpretive Rule was not entitled to
Chevron deference, it instead received deference in accordance with
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 134 Skidmore deference affords an administrative interpretation respect in accordance with "'the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
1 35
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade."'
The Court noted that such deference in this case is tempered by the Attorney
General's lack of expertise in the area136of medicine and the unilateral nature of
his issuance of the Interpretive Rule.
Because the Court had little opportunity to deal with this issue in the
past, it began the Skidmore analysis by examining the text and design of the
statute.137 The Court found that the statute indicated no intent to regulate
medical practice, a silence that the Court found in line with the principles of
federalism. 138 The Court then focused on the registration provision of the
CSA, section 823(f), which requires the Attorney General to consider several
factors when considering whether to revoke a physician's registration, including recommendations of the state licensing board and the registrant's compliance with local drug laws.1 39 The Court reasoned that this consideration,
when considered in concert with Section 903 - a provision that precludes the
CSA from occupying fields to the exclusion of any state law "absent a posi132. Id. at 922. The Court refrained from deciding whether Chevron deference
was appropriate for an interpretation concerning matters closer to the Attorney General's role. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
136. Id. The Court criticized the Attorney General for issuing the rule in "the
apparent absence of any consultation with anyone outside the Department of Justice
who might aid in a reasoned judgment." Id.
137. Id. at 922-23.
138. Id. at 923.
139. Id. "[Tihe structure and limitations of federalism ...allow[s] the States
'great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives,
limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons."' (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996)); see also supra note 31. Section 823(f) is relevant to the
revocation of a physician's registration pursuant to section 824(a)(4), which allows
the Attorney General to suspend or revoke a registration if "the registrant ... has
committed such acts as would render his registration under section 823 of this title
inconsistent with the public interest as determined under such section." 21 U.S.C. §
824(a) (2000).
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tive conflict" - cautions against the conclusion that the CSA displaces the
States' regulation of medicine. 140
Recognizing that ODWDA is one such state medical regulation that the
CSA anticipates, the Court acknowledged that the federal government can set
national standards for the regulation of health and safety despite the fact that
such regulation has historically been "a matter of local concern."' 4' Nonetheless, the Court found that Congress has only done so in one situation: Title I
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Control Act of 1970, of which the CSA
was Title 1I.142 Because Congress set national standards for practice in Title I
in such an explicit manner, the Court reasoned that the silence of the CSA on
the regulation of medical practice makes the Attorney General's position that
the CSA "impliedly criminalizes physician-assisted suicide . . . difficult to
defend. 143 In the view of the Court, while the Government's argument
that because a prescription is required by the CSA for any dispensation of a
Schedule II substance, the implication exists that the substance is being made
available for a legitimate medical purpose - is "[o]n its own ... at least reasonable," the argument as a whole is flawed because it rests on the assumption that by mere implication the CSA allows the Attorney General to invalidate a use merely because it might contravene a single reasonable understanding of medical practice.144
The Court emphasized that the CSA is centered on preventing drug
abuse, and to this end, the conditions to be considered when scheduling a
drug revolve around the drug's tendency to induce psychological or physical
dependence. 145 The prescription requirement is properly understood as preventing addiction or recreational use by ensuring the use of controlled substances under physician supervision.'
Thus, extending the definition of
"drug abuse" to include prescriptions for physician-assisted suicide would be
"discordant with the phrase's consistent use throughout the [CSA], not to
mention its ordinary meaning.' 47
-

140. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 923 ("[N]one of the Act's provisions should be 'construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which
that provision operates.., to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State."' (quoting 21 U.S.C. §
903 (2000))).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 923-24. Title I of the Act provides that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, after consultation with the Attorney General and national experts,
shall determine the appropriate methods of professional practice with regard to treating narcotic addiction. See 42 U.S.C. § 290bb-2a (2000).
143. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 924.
144. Id. ("[S]tatutes 'should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions."' (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995))).
145. Id. at 924-25.
146. Id. at 925.
147. Id.
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Because of the above reasoning, and the fact that the Attorney General
is "an unlikely recipient" of such obscurely granted broad authority "to regulate areas traditionally supervised by the States' police power," the Court held
that the Attorney General is not authorized by the CSA's prescription requirement to bar dispensing controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide in the face of a state regime that authorizes such conduct. 148
Finally, the Court held that Congress never intended to alter the federalstate balance inherent in the regulation of professional medical conduct by
implicitly authorizing the Attorney General to, by fiat, "define general standards of medical practice in every locality." 149 The
1 50Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
B. Justice Scalia'sDissent

The first dissent in Gonzales v. Oregon, written by Justice Scalia and in
which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined, largely followed the
form of the Opinion of the Court in its analysis. Stating that the Opinion of
the Court is a "question-begging conclusion [that] is obscured by a flurry of
arguments that distort the statute and disregard settled principles of our interpretive jurisprudence," Scalia found that the Ninth Circuit's
15 judgment should
be reversed on three "independently sufficient grounds." '
Scalia began his analysis with the text of the Interpretive Rule issued by
Attorney General Ashcroft, 5 2 finding that the Rule purports to accomplish
three things: first, it interprets the phrase 'legitimate medical purpose' in the
Attorney General's own regulation to exclude physician-assisted suicide;
second, it determines that the administration of controlled substances to assist
suicide violates the CSA; and third, it determines that participation in physician-assisted suicide may render a practitioner's registration "inconsistent
with the public interest" under the CSA. 153 Because neither the validity of the
Rule's interpretation of "prescription" nor the propriety of its "legitimate
medical purpose" interpretation were at issue in this case, Scalia found that
"[ilt is beyond dispute.., that a 'prescription'
under [section] 829 must issue
' 154
for a 'legitimate medical purpose."

148. Id. The Court found it unnecessary to consider the application of clear statement requirements or presumptions against preemption to reach "this commonsense
conclusion." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 926.
151. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. For the relevant text of this rule, see supra note 14.
153. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 926 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 926-27.
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1. Auer Deference
According to Scalia, this case requires straightforward application of the
Auer rule that "an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is 'controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' ' 155 Turning
first to the Court's assertion that the Rule merely repeats the language of the
statute and is thus not entitled to Auer deference, Scalia took issue with the
existence of any such exception to Auer.156 In Scalia's opinion, even if such
an exception does exist, it would have no application to the Interpretive Rule
issued by Ashcroft, as "[t]he Court's description of [the Interpretive Rule] as
a regulation that
57 merely paraphrase[s] the statutory language ...

is demon-

strably false."1
To corroborate this assertion, Scalia relied on the possibility of divergent reasonable interpretations of the word "prescription" as it is used in the
CSA.158 Because the original 1971 Regulation modified by Ashcroft's Interpretive Rule clarified the statute by explicitly adopting the narrowest interpretation of the statutory term, Scalia maintained that it added content to the
statute itself.' 59 Any resemblance by the language in the Regulation to phrasing employed in unrelated sections of the CSA is not relevant because this
language "significantly clarifies" the statute, and those sections are not identical to "the only phrase in the Regulation that the [Interpretive Rule] pur155. Id. at 927 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
156. Id. ("The Court cites no authority for [this exception], because there is none.
To the contrary, our unanimous decision in Auer makes clear that broadly drawn
regulations are entitled to no less respect than narrow ones.").
157. Id. (third alteration in original).
158. Id. "First, it might mean any oral or written direction of a practitioner for the
dispensation of drugs." Id. (citing U.S. v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 137 n.13 (1975)).
"On its face [section] 829 addresses only the form that a prescription must take." Id.
(quoting Moore, 423 U.S. at 137 n.13). "Second, in light of the requirement of a
'medical purpose' for the dispensation of Schedule V substances... it might mean a
practitioner's oral or written direction for the dispensation of drugs that the practitioner believes to be for a legitimate medical purpose." Id. at 927-28 (citing 21 U.S.C. §
829(c) (2000)). "Finally, 'prescription' might refer to a practitioner's direction for the
dispensation of drugs that serves an objectively legitimate medical purpose, regardless
of the practitioner's subjective judgment about the legitimacy of the anticipated use."
Id. at 928.
159. Id. ("The medical purpose requirement explicit in subsection (c) [of § 829]
could be implicit in subsections (a) and (b). Regulation § [11306.04 makes it explicit."
(alterations in original) (quoting Moore, 423 U.S. at 137 n.13)). Scalia admits that the
acknowledgement in Moore overlooks the significance of the word "legitimate,"
which he asserts "is most naturally understood to create an objective, federal standard
for appropriate medical uses." Id. at 928 n.1 (citing Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989) ("We start... with the general assumption that in
the absence of a plain indication to the contrary .... Congress when it enacts a statute
is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law.") (omissions
in original).
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ported to construe."' 160 Thus, even if a "parroting" exception exists to Auer
deference, the Regulation does not run "afowl" of such an exception and is
fully entitled
to the substantial deference due an agency's interpretation of its
6
own rule.' 1
Assuming that this was the case, Scalia continued, answering "the only
question remaining;" whether the Interpretive Rule is "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation."' 6 2 Citing Webb v. U.S.' 2 for the proposition
that the Court had itself adopted a similar interpretation as the Interpretive
Rule of "prescription," Scalia found that the Rule's conclusion that physicianassisted suicide is not "legitimate medical
practice" was valid as the "most
164
natural interpretation of that phrase."'
2. Chevron Deference
According to Scalia, even if Auer deference was not warranted, the Interpretive Rule should still be entitled to Chevron deference.' 65 Without explaining his reasoning for this assertion, Scalia began his analysis by attacking the Court's reading of "control" in Section 821 as pertaining only to the
Attorney General's power to add substances to or move substances between
schedules under the CSA 166 as "manifestly erroneous.'

67

160. Id. at 928 (citation omitted). Scalia focuses once again on the importance of
the word "legitimate" and its omission from most of the provisions within the CSA
cited by the Court. Id.; see supra note 101. Additionally, Scalia points out that the
only place where the phrase "legitimate medical purpose" actually appears in the text
of the CSA is Section 830(b)(3)(A)(ii), the language of which was not added to the
CSA until 2000. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 928 n.2. Reasoning that because Congress
did not define "prescription" in section 829, even if the 1971 Regulation had quoted
an identical statutory phrase that existed at the time of its promulgation, the Attorney
General was delegated the authority to resolve any ambiguity therein. Id. at 928. That
he "did so by deeming relevant a technically inapplicable statutory definition contained elsewhere in the statute [section 830(b)(3)(A)(ii)] does not make him a parrot."
Id.
161. Id. at 928-29. Scalia's heavy, and heavy-handed, use of the Court's own
language ("parroting") regarding the Auer exception crescendos into this rather belabored pun, the humor of which is not lost on this author despite the fact that a parrot,
as a bird not of a barnyard variety, or in a wider sense a bird not generally used for
food, is not what is commonly thought of as "fowl." See THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 1069 (Compact ed. 1971) ("Fowl: ... [tihe prevailing sense: A 'barn-

door fowl,' a domestic cock or hen; a bird of the genus Gallus. In the U.S. applied
also to 'a domestic duck or turkey'); but see id. ("Fowl: ...[a]ny feathered vertebrate animal.").
162. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 929 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. 249 U.S. 96 (1919).
164. Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. at 929 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 114-15.
167. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 929 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia's first point of contention with this reading was the fact that the
statutory definition of "control" relied upon by the Court was "defined ...to
mean 'to add a drug or other substance... to a schedule under part B of this
subchapter,"' the portion containing those provisions relating to the scheduling of controlled substances. 168 Scalia maintained that, because Section 821 is
not included in part B of subchapter I of the CSA, but rather in part C, the
definition of "control" contained in Section 802(5) and cited by the Court is
not applicable to "control" as used in Section 821.169 In contrast to the uses of
"control" in part B, in which the term takes some form of "a substance" as its
direct object, 170 Section 821 has the "processes of 'manufacture, distribution,
and dispensing of controlled substances' as the analogue to "a substance"
under the part B uses of "control." 1 71 Scalia claimed that this difference renders "the artificial definition of 'control' in [Section] 802(5) ...inapplicable," and as it is used for its ordinary meaning elsewhere in part C of subchapter 1,172 it should be given that ordinary meaning in Section 821.173
168. Id. (second omission in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 802(5) (2000)). The
full language of Section 802(5) is actually "As used in this subchapter ....[tihe term
'control' means to add a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, to a schedule under part B of this subchapter, whether by transfer from another schedule or
otherwise." 21 U.S.C. § 802(5) (2000). "This subchapter" refers to the portion of the
Controlled Substances Act titled "Subchapter I - Control and Enforcement," codified
in 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000). Part B of Subchapter I, titled "Authority to Control;
Standards and Schedules" is codified in Sections 811-814 of the Act, whereas Part C,
titled "Registration of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dispensers of Controlled
Substances" is codified in Sections 821-830 of the Act.
169. Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. at 929-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). An analysis of the
omitted portion of the Section 802(5) in Scalia's characterization of this definition
makes it apparent that his interpretation runs, perhaps deliberately, contrary to the
plain language of the statute, in which "under part B of this subchapter" clearly modifies "schedule," contained in the same clause of the sentence and for the purpose of
defining "schedule," rather than "[t]he term 'control"' which merely "means to add a
drug or other substance ...

to a schedule," and carries this meaning independent of

the intermediate clause (which could be described as a parenthetical) containing "under part B of this subchapter." 21 U.S.C. § 802(5).
170. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 811(b) ("proceedings . .. to control a drug or other
substance"); Id. § 81 l(c) ("each drug or other substance proposed to be controlled or
removed from the schedules"); Id. § 81 l(d)(1) ("If control is required... the Attorney
General shall issue an order controlling such drug"); Id. § 81 l(d)(4)(A) ("shall issue a
temporary order controlling the drug or substance"); Id. § 812(b) ("Except where
control is required... a drug or other substance may not be placed in any schedule.").
171. Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 823(a)(1), (b)(1), (d)(1), (e)(1), (h)(1) ("maintenance of
effective controls against diversion"); Id. § 823(g)(2)(H)(i) ("Nothing in such regulations. . . may authorize any Federal official or employee to exercise.., control over
the practice of medicine."); Id. § 830(b)(1)(C) ("a listed chemical under the control of
the regulated person").
173. Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia noted that this meaning is further evidenced by Section 821's
status as the opening provision of part C of the subchapter, which relates to
registration with regard to the "manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of
controlled substances.' 7 4 As it makes no sense for the opening provision of
part C to authorize rulemaking pertaining to those powers enumerated in part
B, a reading of Section 821 that grants interpretive authority over part C, including both Section 829's prescription requirement and criteria for registration and deregistration
in Sections 823 and 824, is "[tihe only sensible inter175
pretation."

Scalia concluded that the Attorney General's interpretation of "legitimate medical purpose" is a valid interpretation of the agency's own regulation, or at least a valid agency interpretation of the statute. 76 The Interpretive
Rule provides "the most natural interpretation" of the Regulation and of the
statute, and so is entitled to Auer and/or Chevron deference "definitively establish[ing] that a doctor's order authorizing the dispensation of a Schedule II
substance for the purpose of assisting
a suicide is not a 'prescription' within
177
the meaning of [Section] 829."'
Despite this seemingly definitive conclusion, Scalia continued to analyze the Interpretive Rule in light of the Court's ultimate holding that it was
entitled to neither Auer nor Chevron deference. In his eyes, the same conclusion should result from "the most reasonable interpretation of the Regulation
and of the statute" because the intentional assistance of suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose" as defined by nearly all authorities. 17 8 Scalia emphasized this point and claimed that the Court's assertion that this under174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 931.
177. Id. Scalia takes this to its logical conclusion, that physician-assisted suicide
"may 'render [a physician's] registration.. . inconsistent with the public interest' and
therefore subject to possible suspension or revocation under 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4)."
Id. (omission in original) (quoting Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist
Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001)).
178. Id. (footnote omitted) "'Medicine' refers to '[tihe science and art dealing
with the prevention, cure, or alleviation of disease."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1954 (2d. ed. 1950)). In support of
this claim, Scalia refers to the Office of Legal Counsel opinion, "Whether PhysicianAssisted Suicide Serves a 'Legitimate Medical Purpose' Under the Drug Enforcement
Administration's Regulations Implementing the Controlled Substances Act" dated
June 27, 2001, for the assertion that "virtually every medical authority from Hippocrates to the current American Medical Association (AMA) confirms that assisting
suicide has seldom or never been viewed as a form of prevention, cure, or alleviation
of disease" and that it is not a "legitimate" branch of medicine. Id. at 931-32. The
OLC opinion, originally attached as an appendix to the Interpretive Rule, does not
appear in the Federal Register, but "[i]t is available from the Drug Enforcement Administration." Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
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standing of medicine is "'at least reasonable' tests the limits of understatement.",179 This point is confirmed by the fact that the "overwhelming weight
to extend the boundaries of medicine to cover phyof authority" has declined
80
sician-assisted suicide.'
According to Scalia, the Court has rejected both a uniform federal standard for the medically proper use of controlled substances,' 81 and what he felt
was the most plausible alternative - that any use authorized by the states is a
"legitimate medical purpose" - in favor of "a hazily defined federal standard
based on its purposive reading of the CSA," and derived from only tangentially related sections of the CSA.1 2 Focusing on the Court's "narrow view"
that the only purpose of the CSA is to regulate substances with regard to addiction and recreational use, Scalia excoriated the Court's reasoning on this
subject. In Scalia's view, the CSA should be used in a more sweeping fashion, even though regulation of substances is its main concern.' 8 3 Scalia concluded by stating that the Court's reasoning precludes the prohibition of anabolic-steroid use for bodybuilding purposes. He also stated that the Court's
invocation of the explicit Congressional action controlling these substances
under Schedule 11 of the CSA fails because, "[i]f the only basis for control is
...addiction and recreational abuse,
dispensation of these drugs for body184
building could not be proscribed."'
Scalia further criticized the Court's reliance on Sections 823(f) and 903
for the proposition that the CSA relies on a medical profession regulated under State police powers.' 85 According to Scalia, the registration provisions of
Section 823(f) are inapplicable because they were amended by Congress in
1984 "in order to liberate the Attorney General's power over registration
from the control of state regulators."' 18 6 Similarly, the non-preemption clause
in Section 903 is "embarrassingly inapplicable" because it only proscribes

179. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 932 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting
majority at 924).
180. Id.
181. (178) Scalia finds that such a uniform, objective standard of medicine is
connoted by the use of the word "legitimate." Id. at 931-32 (citing Miss. Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989)).
182. Id. at 932-33.
183. Id. at 933. Scalia contends that a number of references within the CSA shed
light on the undefined term "abuse" that the CSA is designed to restrain; his main
point revolves around a series of factors the Attorney General must consider, such as
"[tihe state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug," "[wihat, if any, risk
there is to the public health," and "such other factors as may be relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety." Id. (alteration in original).
184. Id. at 933-34.
185. Id. at 934.
186. Id. See also Brief for the Petitioners at 34-35, Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
904 (2006) (No. 04-623), 2005 WL 1126079 ("Congress wanted to 'make it easier'
for DEA 'to suspend or revoke the authority of physicians and pharmacists."' (quoting 130 CONG. Rnc. 25,849 (1984) (statement of Rep. Hughes))).
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field preemption while reaffirming preemption in the event of an active conflict between state and federal law. s7 Even if these provisions should apply,
Scalia believed that the Interpretive Rule did not preempt state law "unless
the court is under the misimpression that some States require assisted89 suicide. '' 88 Rather, in his view, it merely interpreted the terms of the CSA.
Furthermore, for Scalia, the Court erred in concluding that the Attorney
General's reading of the CSA fundamentally alters the regulatory scheme by
affording the Attorney General additional power to address other forms of
drug abuse. 190 Because, Scalia reasoned, such additional power does not interfere with the prosecution of drug abuse, it "does absolutely nothing to undermine the central features of' the CSA. 91 Similarly, the argument that the
Attorney General is required to defer to state-law judgments about the constitution of legitimate medical practices because Congress must speak clearly to
preempt such state provisions is flawed for three reasons: first, the Interpretive Rule "does not push the outer limits of Congress's commerce power;"
second, the Interpretive Rule does not preempt any state law, and third, the
Interpretive Rule does not intrude on an area traditionally reserved for the
States. 92 Requiring such a clear statement simply because Congress has prohibited conduct contrarily permitted by 93a state "would be a novel and massive
expansion of the clear-statement rule."'
Scalia finally addressed the possibility that "prescription," as it appears
in Section 829, could not be interpreted to require a "legitimate medical purpose," and found that the Interpretive Rule would still be "unassailable" because of the authorization to register and deregister
194 physicians granted to the
Attorney General by Sections 823(f) and 824(a). Three considerations spell
out that the CSA explicitly grants the Attorney General broad authority over
physician registrations.
First, the Attorney General has the exclusive
charge to administer the registration provisions, and the ambiguity inherent in
the guidelines therein implicitly delegates to the Attorney General the power
187. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 934 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent
on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision
operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law
on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority
of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of
this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently
stand together.
21 U.S.C. § 903 (2000).
188. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 934 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 935.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 935-37.
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to interpret the required factors for consideration. 96 Second, even if explicit
delegation is necessary, such delegation is provided in the language of Section 821 authorizing the Attorney General to make rules regarding registration and control of controlled substances. 97 Third, because the ordinary
meaning of "control" must apply to Section 821, the provision grants the Attorney General rulemaking
authority over all provisions in Part C of Subchap98
ter I of the CSA.'
With these justifications in tow, Scalia attacked the Court's reasoning
that the Attorney General was not authorized to make the determinations incumbent in the Interpretive Rule because the CSA instead reserved exclusive
authority over "scientific and medical determinations" for the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.199 To the contrary, Scalia asserted that Congress
granted the Secretary exclusive authority only in the areas of scheduling and
addiction treatment, and did not establish "a general principle of Secretary
supremacy with regard to all scientific and medical determinations.' 2 ° ° Even
if this were the case, he argued, the registration and deregistration of physidetermicians under the CSA requires neither a "scientific" nor a "medical"
20
nation, but instead implicates only a "naked value judgment." '
Scalia further criticized as "sophistic" the Court's claim that the Interpretive Rule does not purport to exercise any authority to interpret Section
823(f) because it fails to undertake the required five factor analysis. 202 Because the factors can only be applied within the confines of an actual enforcement hearing, it would have been "impossible" for the Attorney General
to do so in the Interpretive Rule.20 3 Rather, the Attorney General merely
sought to clarify or signal his interpretation of these factors, which is indi196. Id. at 936. Scalia focuses on those criteria within the statute that contain such
ambiguities as "conduct which may threaten the public health and safety," and "acts
[that] would render ... registration under [the Act] inconsistent with the public interest." See 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(0(5), 824(a)(4) (2000). Scalia characterizes the Court's
focus on explicit delegation provisions within the CSA as "a fossil of our pre-Chevron
era." Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 936 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 936 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (omission in original)
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2000)) ("Because dispensing refers to the delivery of a
controlled substance pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, the deregistration
of such practitioners for writing impermissible orders relat[es] to the registration...
of the ... dispensing of controlled substances." (alteration in original) (omissions in
original) (citation omitted)).
198. Id. at 936-37.
199. Id. at 937.
200. Id.
201. Id. ("It is entirely reasonable to think (as Congress evidently did) that it
would be easier for the Attorney General occasionally to make judgments about the
legitimacy of medical practices than it would be for the Secretary to get into the business of law enforcement.").
202. Id. at 938. See also supra note 33.
203. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 938 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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cated by the conditional terms used in the Rule. °4 From this, it follows that
the Attorney General may weigh a physician's participation in physician-5
assisted suicide as a factor against registration or in favor of deregistration.20
Scalia took issue with the Court's assertion that the mere citation of "public
interest" or "public health" could not be used by the Attorney General to deregister a physician, claiming that the Attorney General's discretion is "certainly no broader than other 2congressionally
conferred Executive powers that
6
we have upheld in the past. 0
Scalia's argument concluded with his speculation that the Court was
driven to this result by a "feeling
the subject of assisted suicide is none of
,
• that
,,207
the Federal Government's business.
While expressing sympathy for such
a position, Scalia countered that sentiment by drawing attention to the history
of using federal commerce power to protect public morality. 20 In Scalia's
view, "[t]he question.

. .

is not whether Congress can .. .or even whether

Congress should do this; but simply whether Congress has done this in the
CSA," and unsurprisingly, he concluded that it had.
C. Justice Thomas's Dissent

Justice Thomas, writing a brief dissent, presumably to expound upon
Scalia's opinion in which he joined, began his opinion by discussing the
Court's ruling in Gonzales v. Raich,210 which was decided "a mere seven
months" prior.21' Thomas characterized the Court's ruling in Oregon as
"beat[ing] a hasty retreat from" this conclusion, as it instead held "that the
CSA is merely concerned with fighting 'drug abuse' and only insofar' 212
as that
abuse leads to 'addiction or abnormal effects on the nervous system.'
204. Id. "Such conduct by a physician... may 'render his registration... inconsistent with the public interest' and therefore subject to possible suspension or revocation under 21 U.S.C. [§]824(a)(4)." Id. (alteration in original) (omissions in original)
(quoting Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607,
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001)).
205. Id. ("[T]he condemnation of assisted suicide by 50 American jurisdictions
supports the Attorney General's view.").
206. Id.
207. Id. at 939.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
211. Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. at 939 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). In Raich, the Court held
that the "manner" in which controlled substances can be used "for medicinal purposes" is a "core ac-tivit[y] regulated by the CSA." Id. (quoting Raich, 125 S.Ct. at
2211).
212. Id. at 939-40. Thomas noted that "[t]he majority does not expressly address
whether the ingestion of a quantity of drugs that is sufficient to cause death has an
'abnormal effec[t] on the nervous system,' though it implicitly rejects such a conclusion." Id. at 940 n.1 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Thomas was further
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To illustrate this point, Thomas compared the reasoning in Raich, in
which the majority held that the CSA was applicable to intrastate possession
of a controlled substance because "'Congress could have rationally' concluded that such an application was necessary to the regulation of the 'larger
interstate marijuana market,"' to the reasoning in the instant case, in which
the Court's "restrictive interpretation of the CSA is based in no small part on
'the structure and limitations of federalism."' 21 3 Depicting the consideration
of federalism as "water over the dam, ' 214 Thomas attacked the court's justification on the basis thereof as irrelevant for two reasons: first, the issue at bar
was merely one of statutory interpretation, 215 and second, the respondents
have not pressed a constitutional claim. 2 16 Because the Court here relied on
the principles it expressly
rejected in Raich, Thomas felt that the decision was
z

wrongly reached.

V. COMMENT

Though both the Opinion of the Court and Scalia's dissent in Gonzales
v. Oregon seem to treat the issue at hand as a Chevron case, the reality is that
despite its numerous invocations throughout, Chevron is only tangentially

implicated by the Opinion. Under the original Chevron analysis, the question
of whether such deference is due the Attorney General would have been, on

its face, a relatively simple one, at least in comparison to earlier doctrines. 218
puzzled, as this "newfound understanding of the CSA... rests upon constitutional
principles that the majority of the Court rejected in Raich." Id. at 940.
213. Id. (quoting Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2213). Though Thomas felt that the Attorney
General's power under the CSA may be "troubling" in its scope, he reiterated Scalia's
opinion that it is not out of character given the Court's recent opinions, and is even
"the inevitable and inexorable consequence of this Cdurt's Commerce Clause and
separation-of-powers jurisprudence." Id.
214. "The relevance of such considerations was at its zenith in Raich, when we
considered whether the CSA could be applied to the intrastate possession of a controlled substance consistent with the limited federal powers enumerated by the Constitution." Id. at 941.
215. "[W]e are interpreting broad, straightforward language within a statutory
framework that a majority of this Court has concluded is so comprehensive that it
necessarily nullifies the States' 'traditional .

.

. powers . . . to protect the health,

safety, and welfare of their citizens."' Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Raich, 125
S.Ct. at 2195 n.28).
216. Id. at 941 n.2 ("[R]espondents have not seriously pressed a constitutional
claim here, conceding at oral argument that their 'point is not necessarily that [the
CSA] would be unconstitutional.' ... Framed in this manner, the claim must fail."
(alteration in original)).
217. Id. at 941.
218. See Note, "How Clear is Clear" in Chevron's Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1687, 1688-90 (2005) ("On its face, the Chevron decision seemed categorical with
respect to when the two-step approach should apply.").
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However, as case law since Chevron has indicated, the questions driven by
even the simple-seeming first step - whether Congress has clearly spoken to
an issue - are not so clear in most instances, and the inquiry surrounding the
Attorney General's Interpretive Rule is no exception.
This case provides an example of how courts can use statutory interpretation in a Chevron analysis to define the outcome of a case. If a court finds
that deference is warranted, there is a very strong inference that the agency
decision will be upheld. Contrarily, if a court decides that deference is unwarranted it is free to discard the decision, and though Skidmore still receives
favorable treatment, it is virtually no barrier from overruling agency decisions
if a court so desires. As judges are human beings, it is more than likely that
they have personal opinions on a given agency decision, and this case is no
exception. The way that the Court's opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent interpreted the CSA to determine whether Chevron deference was warranted in
the instant decision undoubtedly provides insight into the predisposed substantive conclusions on both sides of the decision. While this is by no means
an allegation that such a predisposition is the sole or even the primary reason
for whether the Court defers in a given case, it would be truly naive to suggest that such a consideration has never entered and will never enter into the
decision making process with regard to a Chevron analysis.
Chevron questions, particularly post-Mead, have become a question of
constructive statutory meaning, with the real differences in opinion occurring
in how best to derive such meaning, whether it be a purely textual approach
or one derivative of legislative intent. 219 As a result, the heart of the dispute
between the majority and the dissenting Justices results not merely from
statutory interpretation, but a fundamental philosophical difference in how to
interpret statutes.22 In formulating the meaning of the CSA for this case, the
specific question that must be answered in the affirmative before Chevron
deference is proper is whether the Attorney General was delegated the authority to issue Interpretive Rules on the subject matter at hand with the force of
law.

219. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE. L. J. 969, 992 n.101 (1992). Merrill disagrees with Scalia's belief that "textualism leads to determinate results in most cases and that introducing evidence of intent
to 'impeach' the text muddies things up and thus requires deference." Id. Rather, he
asserts that "textualism will answer the 'precise question' at issue in so few cases that
it leads courts to abandon the quest for specific congressional answers, thus allowing
a dramatically expanded judicial role at step one." Id. This assertion is bome out in
the instant decision, in which a purely textual approach as Scalia takes seems to leave
almost infinite room for ambiguity.
220. For a full discussion of textualism versus intentionalism, see Caleb Nelson,
What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005).
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1. Delegation with the Force of Law?
Justice Scalia, often a torch-bearer for the textualist school,221 goes to
great lengths to demonstrate that such delegation did here exist, and indeed,
scores some compelling points along the way. But ultimately, though much of
his approach rings true, such truth lies in a superficial analysis, and while
Scalia's argument focuses on many of the details, it fails to take into account
the whole picture. In framing his arguments in the language of textualism,
Scalia imputes his interpretation to a plain, common sense reading of the statute. In reality, this reading is simply another way of deriving Congressional
intent, which Scalia finds was to delegate authority to the Attorney General to
interpret the meaning of "legitimate medical purpose."
Scalia attempted to approach the problem from every possible angle to
justify his conclusion that the Attorney General's Interpretive Rule is entitled
to substantial deference from the Court, and his argument suffers as a result.
For example, in asserting the correctness of Auer deference, he balks at the
idea of a "parroting" exception, relying on the presumption that the absence
222
of evidence for such a doctrine is evidence of its absence. Scalia did aban223
don this reductio ad absurdum argument in favor of an analysis of the Interpretive Rule, by focusing on the fact that the language of the 1971 Regulation is not identical to that of the statute.224 In doing so, Scalia missed the
point that, though there may exist differences between the two in their sylis at least sublabic and lexical manifestations, substantively the Regulation
225
stantially similar if not virtually identical to the Statute.
Scalia's argument about the issue at the center of this controversy that Congress, through the CSA, used the federal commerce power to prevent
physician-assisted suicide through an implicit delegation to the Attorney
General to regulate the process of registering physicians in such a manner as
to dictate what is medically permissible conduct 226 - is appealing when one
merely focuses on the details he uses as support.22 7 However, any evidence
221. For one analysis of the jurisprudential philosophy of Justice Scalia, see
DANIEL

A.

FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKiNG CERTAINTY: THE

29-54 (2002).
222. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 927 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223. "Reduction to the absurd."

MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTrrUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

224. See supra note 159.
225. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 915.
226. Id. at 939 (Scalia J., dissenting) ("The question ... is ... simply whether

Congress has [delegated this authority] in the CSA.").
227. Scalia is undoubtedly correct in that no reasonable reading of the statute

could possibly encompass the interpretation of every iteration of the word "control" to
pertain solely to the scheduling, removal from the schedules, and reclassification
between schedules of controlled substances. And creative use of ellipses notwithstanding, see supra notes 169-170, he is also correct that, in Section 829 of the CSA,
the use of the word "control" does not appear, within a commonsense reading, to be
bound by the definition in the first part of the Act.
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that this delegation exists is buried deep within the CSA, and finding it requires looking past the plain language of the statute to reinterpret Congress'
clear definition of "control" to only take hold if the word "take[s] a substance
as its direct object. ' ' 228 Such a reading, though couched in the language of
textualism, is at its heart a constructive extrapolation of the possible intention
of Congress to delegate what amounts to sweeping de facto authority to the
Attorney General to decide unilaterally what is medically permissible. Essentially, it is the narrowest possible interpretation of what constitutes whether
Congress has "clearly spoken" to the issue. The inference drawn as a result is
at best an unlikely conclusion, even taking into account the 1984 amendments
to the CSA liberating from state oversight the Attorney General's power to
register physicians.
A conclusion that is at least equally likely is that which the Court
reached in its opinion: that such an indirect and obfuscatory delegation, assuming it exists, does not carry the force of law. Though the Attorney General is free to view the use of controlled substances as disfavored in light of
the "public health and safety" factor explicitly defined within the CSA, other
factors must be weighed in deciding whether a physician's conduct is consistent with the public interest, including state laws and regulations.2 29 By examining the CSA as a whole, and interpreting the statute in light of its other provisions, the Court's reasoning in this regard invokes the intentionalist canon
of conveying the policy decisions Congress made when enacting the CSA.23°
Its holding is straightforward: in order for a rule to qualify for Chevron deference, it is fundamentally important that the rule was promulgated within the
scope of Congress' delegation. 23 1 The Court rightly concluded on the basis
that Congress has not explicitly delegated authority to define "legitimate
medical practice" to the Attorney General that his Interpretive Rule was not
entitled to the substantial deference afforded by Chevron. Such a conclusion
is further bolstered by three important considerations.
2. Shared Authority
The first consideration is that the CSA delegates shared authority to both
the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Attorney General.
Though Section 823(f) does relegate exclusive control of rulemaking authority regarding the registration of physicians to the Attorney General, an examination of the CSA as a whole yields the conclusion that it was the intent
of Congress that the Attorney General's responsibility for scientific and
medical decisions is shared with and deferential to the judgment of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 929-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2000).
See Nelson, supra note 224, at 351-53.
Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. at 922.
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Scalia's first counter-argument to this holistic reading of the CSA that the Secretary's primacy in medical matters does not apply because Congress' explicit assertion of this primacy is limited to the areas of scheduling
and addiction treatment - relies on two assumptions. First is the presumption
that Congress decided it was more reasonable for the Attorney General to
make medical judgments than it was for the Secretary to "get into the business of law enforcement. 2 32 This argument, which essentially posits that
deciding what is a "legitimate medical purpose" is within the exclusive purview of law enforcement, moves beyond the realm of false dichotomy and
approaches spuriousness. 233 Second is the assumption that Congress must
explicitly delegate such primary authority within the text of the statute for
every aspect to which it is to apply. This same reasoning is characterized by
Scalia himself as "a fossil of our pre-Chevron era" when he accuses the majority of focusing on explicit delegation provisions in concluding that the
Attorney General lacked authority to declare physician-assisted suicide illegitimate.23
It is Scalia's second counter-argument to the Court's assertion of Secretary primacy that is the most interesting. Scalia asserted that, even if the Secretary was the ultimate authority on scientific and medical judgments within
the CSA, the legitimacy of physician-assisted suicide is no more dependent
upon a scientific or medical judgment, than is "the legitimacy of polygamy.''235 Rather, Scalia claimed that the question of physician-assisted suicide
is a "naked value judgment" that renders the Secretary's "medical expertise..
strikingly irrelevant.' 2 36 This argument fails for two reasons.
First, the act of defining that which constitutes a "legitimate medical
purpose" is lexically, rhetorically, and substantively a "medical" judgment.
Scalia cleverly casts the issue in different terms (using the rhetorical flourish
of polygamy as a capstone) to disguise its true nature, but at issue is not
whether the Attorney General has authority to decide if the use of controlled
substances to carry out physician-assisted suicide is morally correct, but
whether he has the authority to decide if it is medically legitimate.
Second, if we are to reduce issues of controversy to "naked value judgments" regardless of their context, as Scalia asserted, the meaning of statutory
language asymptotically approaches the realm of total deconstruction. Taken
232. Id. at 937 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. This is not meant to be a purely pejorative assessment, but the absurdity of
such a position is evident if extrapolated beyond the arcane world of agency interpretation to a family doctor's office. One can imagine the indignation of medical practitioners and patients alike were Congress to assert that diagnosis techniques would be
better decided by law enforcement officials if there was any danger of illegal activity
becoming tangentially involved, or worse, were law enforcement officials to make the
same assertion based on a "gap" in legislation.
234. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 936 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 937-38.
236. Id. at 938 (citation omitted).
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to the extreme, this idea effectively undermines the very legitimacy of agency
expertise, the foundation upon which agency authority is built. Science, to
take one example, often generates controversy, both within a given discipline,
and between the scientific community and other facets of society.237 If a disagreement, albeit a fundamental one, on the "rightness" of a method, action,
or decision is all that is required to remove what can be extraordinarily complicated assessments from the purview of agencies or actors that at least purport to have scientific expertise, no end of "naked value judgments" could
presumably arise to deprive these agencies of their authority to make the very
judgments for which they were created. Put succinctly, such a doctrine is
antithetical to the purpose of Chevron itself, in that deference to agency authority is predicated on the notion that technical experts are better situated
than the courts, who would presumably retain the ultimate decision-making
authority, to make complicated determinations.
3. Unilateral Circumvention of Required Analysis
The second consideration that bolsters the Court's ruling is that Attorney
General Ashcroft, in issuing the Interpretive Rule, did so unilaterally and
without undergoing any of the statutorily required analyses. When the CSA
has delegated rulemaking authority to the Attorney General, it is either in
conjunction with the Secretary of Health and Human Resources, subject to a
specific analysis with prescribed factors for the Attorney General's consideration, or both. If delegated rulemaking authority with the force of law is to be
inferred from what are essentially a few linguistic inconsistencies, the assertion that Congress would impliedly delegate greater authority to the Attorney
General than that which is explicitly defined confounds a common sense understanding of the law. This is particularly true in light of both the complexity
of the CSA and the fact that the purportedly delegated authority is not subject
to strictures at least as restrictive as that which is explicitly granted. Rather, a
sensible understanding that implied authority is subordinate to that which is
explicitly delegated yields the conclusion that the Interpretive Rule was not
issued within the scope of even an implicit delegation by Congress, and is
therefore not entitled to Chevron deference.
4. Past Congressional Gridlock
The third and perhaps most important consideration is that after Attorney General Reno had made the determination in 1997 that her office was not
authorized under the CSA to declare physician-assisted suicide outside the
bounds of "legitimate medical practice," members of Congress unsuccess237. See, e.g., Jay A. Labinger & Steve J. Weininger, Controversy in Chemistry:
What Counts as Evidence? - Two Studies in Molecular Structure, 43 ANGEWANDTE
CHEMIsTRY INT. ED. 2612 (2004).
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fully attempted to amend the CSA to proscribe the use of controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide. It is perhaps telling that neither the
majority nor the dissents took up this issue, but the implications are truly at
the center of this controversy.
In 1997, when they first petitioned the DEA to enact the Interpretive
Rule eventually promulgated by Ashcroft, Senator Hatch and Representative
Hyde may well have been under the good faith impression that the CSA authorized the Attorney General, and by proxy the DEA, to restrict the definition of "legitimate medical purpose" unilaterally. When ultimately rebuked
by Attorney General Reno's legal opinion, they sought to give the CSA that
explicit definition through the legislative process by passing the Pain Relief
Promotion Act (PRPA). Only after the failure of this effort did Attorney General Ashcroft, who, as a senator himself in 1999, and who had no doubt witnessed the Senatorial debate that eventually killed the PRPA, attempt to enact
by executive fiat what the legislature had failed to do by constitutionally
delegated process two years earlier.
Although this unquestionably novel approach did circumvent delay and
defeat by the legislative process, it raises some provocative questions. If Congress fails to enact a change that even many of its members desire, and the
Executive claims general authority as a result of Congress' purported failure
to speak clearly on the issue to enact the very change Congress tried and
failed to do, is the Executive entitled to substantial deference in its attempt to
"fill the gap" effectively caused by Congressional disagreement? One argument against such deference lies in the assumption that Chevron deference is
fundamentally a method for extrapolating constructive legislative intent from
the ambiguities of a given statutory scheme. There is a strong case that when
an agency attempts to claim constructive legislative intent for authority to
enact change on an issue over which there has been Congressional deadlock,
this deadlock is evidence of a contrary intent not to allow the Executive to
unilaterally enact the very change upon which Congress could not agree.
From a purely textualist standpoint, the counter-argument that the absence of
consensus is no evidence for Congressional intent specifically not to delegate
authority is easily made, but the agency at question should still ultimately
bear the burden of proof for any such delegation.
It is not difficult to sympathize with a desire to avoid this sort of debate,
if indeed such a desire were present on either side of this case, as it could lead
to still more questions about the foundation of Chevron and deference to
agency interpretation generally. The Court found no need here to address
such issues, though they undoubtedly lurk beneath the surface of the arguments both for the majority and the dissent.

238. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 913 (majority opinion).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Presumably, were this case to be heard today, the decision would be
rendered in much the same terms, though the substitution of Justice Alito for
Justice O'Connor would likely make it numerically closer. 239 Nothing present
in this case, or indeed in much of recent administrative law jurisprudence,
amounts to a definitive resolution of agency deference. And certainly the
majority opinion made no attempt to resolve the issue of whether physicianassisted suicide is an acceptable practice, though Scalia's dissent did not refrain from answering that question in the negative. But the substance matter
of this case is still wide open; the Court did not close the door to further Congressional tinkering with the CSA in order to effectuate the delegation that it
refused to find implicit in the Act.
In the end, these are undoubtedly controversies that will be revisited.
Physician-assisted suicide is still legal in Oregon, and will be debated in the
future, whether in statehouses, in Congress, or in the courts. Chevron deference, likewise, remains an unsettled issue; Scalia will continue fighting the
battle he presaged with his Mead dissent, perhaps with an increasing number
of votes as time progresses. Further, implementation of the seemingly everevolving doctrine will continue to shift as courts try to come to a consensus
on just what it looks like when Congress has "clearly spoken to" a given issue, or failing that, just how much authority has been delegated in a given
"gap" when they have not.
On an even wider scope, the debate about the propriety of textualism
and intentionalism will continue to be influenced by the growing body of
cases evincing the results of one methodology or the other. This really is a
false dichotomy, as Gonzales v. Oregon demonstrates, in that no matter what
they espouse as philosophical or jurisprudential canons of statutory interpretation, Justices and Judges alike can, do, and should utilize elements of both
as tools in their quest for the most satisfying resolution of a given controversy. If there is a "war" of ideas ongoing in the Court, it only makes sense
that each side would employ all the tools available to "win." Given the highly
charged political climate, courts purporting to use either method will draw
accusations of judicial activism as a result of the substantive outcome in a
given dispute, and no doubt to a certain extent such a label is not entirely
untrue, though whether it deserves its recently acquired pejorative connotation is an entirely separate discussion. And while the analogy of war is undoubtedly hyperbole and overstates the atmosphere surrounding controversy
like physician-assisted suicide, for many within and outside of the judicial
system, the stakes are no less high.
ALFRED J. LUDWIG
239. See, e.g., Jane Roh, Supreme Court Backs Oregon Assisted Suicide Law, Fox
NEWS, Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,181881,00.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2006).
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